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RESPONDING TO JURY DUTY AVOIDANCE
THOMAS L. FOWLER*
"[J]ury service is the solemn obligation of all qualified citizens, and...
excuses from the discharge of this responsibility should be granted only
for reasons of compelling personal hardship or because requiring ser-
vice would be contrary to the public welfare, health, or safety."'
INTRODUCTION
In the fall of 1997 and the spring of 1998, the Administrative Office
of the Courts [hereinafter "AOC"] conducted a statewide survey to
gather information about jury service in North Carolina. The Jury
Service Project Final Report,2 published in July of 1998, profiles the
characteristics of the average juror,3 details the reported hardships of
jury duty,4 suggests improvements to the jury system,5 and summa-
rizes the summoning and excusal practices of the various counties.6 In
addition, the Jury Service Project concludes that in North Carolina a
significant number of persons summoned as jurors fail to appear as
directed or simply never respond to the summons.7 In some counties,
close to half of those summoned fail to appear.8 Although not widely
* Director, Judges' Legal Research Program, Administrative Office of the Courts, Ra-
leigh, North Carolina; B.A. 1975, J.D. 1980, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. A
version of this article was previously published in the North Carolina Institute of Government's
publication Popular Government (Spring 1999).
1. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 9-6(a) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
2. THE CTR. FOR URBAN AFFAIRS & COMMUNITY SERVICES, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE
COURTS (AOC) JURY SURVEY PROJECT FINAL REPORT (1998).
3. The average juror is 43 years old, white, female, and married, with 13.6 years of formal
education. Id. at 4-7, 36.
4. The most frequently reported hardships as a result of jury service were having to rear-
range work schedules, losing wages, and parking problems. Id. Summary of Findings at 9-11.
5. Jurors' suggestions for improving the jury system included more efficient use of their
time (including informing the jurors about the reasons for delay), better parking and courthouse
facilities for jurors, improved financial ease of jury service, and a streamlined voir dire process.
Id. at 41.
6. Surveys were returned from 99 of the 100 counties. Id. Analysis of the 1998 Clerks of
Super. Ct. Survey on Jury Practices and Facilities at 1.
7. Analysis of the 1998 Clerks of Super. Ct. Survey on Jury Practices and Facilities at 2.
8. Id.
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recognized, this problem is neither new nor limited to our state. Fill-
ing the jury box has often been a struggle for our nation's courts. 9
Filling the jury box can be a significant problem for the court system
because the judiciary must ensure that enough citizens will be present
on a given day to provide the twelve jurors plus alternates who must
serve in each trial scheduled for that day. Enough jurors may not be
available to proceed with a trial for several reasons.1 ° First, as men-
tioned, the potential juror may ignore the summons. Second, the po-
tential juror may be excused for a legitimate reason before the date of
the summons. Third, once in the courtroom, the juror may be excused
or peremptorily challenged by one of the parties to the lawsuit. The
jury pool must therefore be several times greater than the number of
jurors actually needed to hear a trial. High or unpredictable rates of
jury duty avoidance could potentially bring the courts to a grinding
halt.11
This article argues that the applicable North Carolina statutes do
not clearly define how the court system should respond to such jury
duty avoidance. As a result, North Carolina's judicial districts have
developed no formal procedures for handling jurors who fail to ap-
pear when summoned for jury duty. Part I chronicles the history of
jury avoidance and the law's responses, including the sheriff summon-
ing citizens in and near the courthouse and punishing jurors with the
payment of a fine. Part II reviews the pertinent jury duty statutes in
North Carolina.
9. See generally Nancy J. King, Juror Delinquency in Criminal Trials in America, 1796-
1996, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2673 (1996) (examining avoidance of jury duty and misconduct while
serving); Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the
United States, 61 UNIV. OF CHI. L. REV. 867 (1994) (surveying the evolution of the jury system in
the United States); Kurt M. Saunders, Race and Representation in Jury Service Selection, 36 Duo.
L. REV. 49 (1997) (studying jury selection process and factors that influence representation of
racial and socioeconomic groups).
10. For instance, one recent study found that Maricopa County, Arizona had a "juror yield"
of only 22.5% of the total number of citizens summoned for jury duty: 25.5% of the summonses
were undeliverable; 6.5% of the summoned jurors were not qualified to serve; 27% were ex-
cused for hardship reasons; and 18.5% of summoned jurors simply did not appear as directed.
ROBERT G. BOATRIGHT, AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y, IMPROVING CITIZEN RESPONSE TO JURY SUM-
MONSES: A REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS 85 (1998).
11. The report issued by the American Judicature Society states:
In many jurisdictions, summons nonresponse is a critical problem because the courts find
that they do not have enough jurors to conduct trials. Horror stories abound of courts in
cities such as Los Angeles and New York where trials must be delayed because of lack of
available jurors, or where court personnel must walk around outside of the courthouse look-
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I. HISTORICAL RESPONSES
A. Sheriff Summons of Citizens In and Near the Courthouse
Since colonial days, citizens have sought to avoid jury duty,12 and
legislatures and court officials have searched for effective methods to
secure their service. One historical response was to rely upon the
sheriff's ability to round up bystanders found in or near the court-
house to serve on the jury. In North Carolina, as in other states, "nu-
merous bystanders" attended a court in session. 3 When the regularly
summoned jurors were insufficient to fill the jury box, the court was
empowered to order the sheriff to summon these bystanders or tales-
men as potential jurors.
14
.Commentators often criticized this heavy reliance on bystanders be-
cause this process was not representative of the citizenry and resulted
in a lower caliber of juror.' 5 In 1803, the American edition of Black-
stone's Commentaries reported that, after the first day or two, juries
hearing civil lawsuits in the rural areas of Virginia were "made up,
generally, of idle loiterers about the court,... the most unfit persons
to decide upon the controversies of suitors." 6 In State v. McDowell, 7
12. An early North Carolina case provides an example. In State v. Hogg, 6 N.C. (2 Mur.)
319 (1818), a commissioner of navigation for the Port of Wilmington was summoned for jury
duty as a bystander or talesman. The would-be juror claimed that because of the office he held
he was exempt from serving on juries by statute; he prayed for a discharge. The court held that
although the statute would have exempted him from service as a regularly summoned juror
because such service could interfere with the performance of his important profession, he was
not exempt from serving as a tales juror (i.e., someone found in or about the courtroom). The
court reasoned that his very presence at the courthouse as a bystander "proves that he has not
then any official or professional engagements that require his attention." Id. at 319-20. See also
State v. Willard, 79 N.C. 660, 662 (1878) ("And it is because a talesman must be taken from the
bystanders at the Court that he may be summoned, as his being a bystander proves that he was
not there on official or professional duties which required his attention.").
13. State v. Scott, 8 N.C. (1 Hawks) 24, 26 (1820).
14. State v. Benton, 19 N.C. (2 Dev. & Bat.) 196, 201 (1836) (holding that if the court
neglects to nominate freeholders to serve as jurors or the persons so nominated shall fail to
attend, "it shall be lawful for such Superior Court to order the sheriff to summon other freehold-
ers of the bystanders, to serve as jurors; and the persons so summoned shall be held and deemed
lawful jurors."). See also State v. Lamon, 10 N.C. (9 Hawks) 175, 180 (1824) (noting defendant
argued that to be properly qualified to serve as talesmen, bystanders must be found "about the
courthouse"); State v. Emery, 224 N.C. 581, 582, 31 S.E.2d 858, 860 (1944) (holding that two
women should have been excused as jurors since they were not qualified due to their sex).
15. In 1885, one commentator noted: "[Bletter qualified classes of citizens do not serve as
jurymen. By some peculiar way they fail to be drawn .... or if perchance drawn, manage to get
excused. All lawyers know this to be a fact .... As a result there is generally left for this
important public service but a residuum of stupid and incompetent species of the genus homo
.... It were as reasonable and proper in time of war to excuse our able-bodied men and draft
.none but cripples and puny-bodied unfortunates ...." Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 9, at 882
n.83 (citing S. Stewart Whitehouse, Trial By Jury, As It Is, and As It Should Be, 31 ALB L. REv.
504, 505-06 (1885)).
16. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 Commentaries App. 64 (St. George Tucker ed. 1803).
17. 123 N.C. 764, 31 S.E. 89 (1898).
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the North Carolina Supreme Court echoed this opinion. In this case,
the trial court, after failing to get a jury from the persons present in
the courtroom, adjourned until the next morning and directed the
sheriff to summon fifty freeholders from the county to attend the next
day. 8 The next day the court directed the sheriff to call those sum-
moned, who were then bystanders, into the jury box.' 9 The defendant
objected on the grounds that those jurors "were not bystanders on the
day before, and were then present only by reason of said summons by
the sheriff under said order of the court. 1 °2 0 The trial court overruled
the objection, and the supreme court upheld the trial court stating:
The order was an expedient act in reference to the business of the
court. It was calculated to secure an impartial jury, by getting men
from the county, honest, uncommitted, unbought and unmerchantable
men, rather than the professional, loafing jurymen, who hang about
the courthouses, ready to be used if it should happen that prosecutors
or prosecuting officers, or defendants or defendants' counsel or sher-
iffs, or their deputies should so far forget their occupation and honora-
ble obligation as to bring them into the jury box. 2
Today, North Carolina continues to authorize the trial court to or-
der the sheriff to summon additional jurors not on the jury list when
the original venire is exhausted,22 although North Carolina law no
longer restricts the sheriff to select bystanders in and about the court-
house. The sheriff appears to be free to locate appropriate jurors
"from the body of the county," 23 whether in or near the courthouse, at




21. Id. at 767. See also Hale v. Whitehead, 115 N.C. 28, 29, 20 S.E. 166, 166 (1894) (charac-
terizing the courthouse bystanders as "professional jurors" who might "monopoliz[e] the jury
box.").
22. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 9-11(a)(Cum. Supp. 1998); see also State v. Wilson 313 N.C. 516, 524,
330 S.E.2d 450, 457 (1985) ("We have held that N.C.G.S. 9-11(a) clearly authorizes the trial court
to order the summoning of supplemental jurors as a means to ensure orderly, uninterrupted and
speedy trials."); State v. Brown, 13 N.C. App. 261, 271, 185 S.E.2d 471, 477-78 (1971) (noting
that the trial judge ordered sheriff to summon twenty-five additional jurors without resorting to
the regular jury list pursuant to section 9-11(a) of the North Carolina General Statutes).
23. State v. Hollingsworth, 11 N.C. App. 674, 677, 182 S.E.2d 26, 28 (1971).
24. In State v. White, 6 N.C. App. 425, 427, 169 S.E.2d 895, 896 (1969), the sheriff used the
telephone book as his method of locating and selecting tales jurors. He testified that he called
some sixty prospective jurors in the course of securing nine tales jurors. The court of appeals
approved of this approach stating:
Nowhere in the statute is there a provision delineating discretionary restrictions to be
placed on an officer in fulfilling the court's order. The statutory recognition that tales jurors
may be needed and the statutory language used contemplates a system easily and expedi-
tiously administered. To place procedural restrictions unnecessarily on their selection
would defeat the purpose of the system, which is to facilitate the dispatch of the business of
the court. Tales jurors are selected infrequently and only to provide a source from which to
fill the unexpected needs of the court. They must still possess the statutory qualifications
[Vol. 23:1
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B. Payment of Fines
Courts also responded to the failure of summoned citizens to ap-
pear by punishing the recalcitrant jurors with the payment of a fine.
Fining those who failed to obey summonses appeared to be a universal
response to jury dodging throughout the colonial period, and in the
early 1800s statutes in most states authorized fines ranging from one
dollar to $250. Enforcement efforts were quite vigorous in some juris-
dictions. For example, court records from the Michigan Territory re-
veal that contempt proceedings against delinquent jurors occupied
much of the circuit court's caseload .... Many less wealthy veniremen
complied in order to avoid the fine. For those with means, however,
contempt citations appeared to have operated not as a burden, but as
a privilege. Exemption from jury duty was a prerequisite that money
could buy. A careful investigation of fines for nonattendance of jurors
in South Carolina during the 1790s revealed that fines were sufficient
only to assure the attendance of the less wealthy. Most of those fined
for failing to report for jury duty were the community's most promi-
nent citizens.2 6
In these situations, enforcement of fines has not always been pursued
consistently or vigorously. One commentator in Pennsylvania has es-
timated that:
[B]etween 25% and 50% of citizens who receive [juror] questionnaires
ignore them; only 55% of citizens summoned for jury service actually
bother to appear for service. This situation results from the wide-
spread failure of courts to investigate or sanction those who disregard
the warnings on their jury summonses. These individuals simply 'opt
out' of service by ignoring the questionnaire or summons when there
is a history of no follow-up or sanctions for such conduct.27
and are still subject to the same challenges as regular jurors and may be examined by both
parties on voir dire. In order to retain the flexibility needed in the administration of such a
system, the summoning official must be permitted some discretion, whether he be located in
a relatively small community or a more heavily populated area ....
Id. at 427-28, 169 S.E.2d at 896-97. In State v. Yancey, 58 N.C. App. 52, 293 S.E.2d 298 (1982),
acting pursuant to a section 9-11(a) order of the North Carolina General Statutes, the sheriff
testified:
that he did not attempt to get a list from the clerk of superior court or the register of deeds,
but attempted to get people that were readily available and could come on short notice. He
testified that so far as he knew he summoned persons who were of good character and
respected members of the community.
Id. at 54, 293 S.E.2d at 299.
25. See State v. Williams, 18 N.C. (1 Dev. & Bat.) 371, 372 (1835) (noting that the juror who
refused to serve was fined twenty dollars); State v. Willard, 79 N.C. 660, 661 (1878) (noting that a
juror who refused to serve was also fined).
26. King, supra note 9, at 2683-84.
27. Saunders, supra note 9, at 64. See also BOATRIGHTr, supra note 10, at vii, 13 (noting that
in state courts 20% of citizens summoned for jury failed to appear, and that in urban jurisdic-
tions such as New York or Los Angeles, summons response rates can fall below 10% of all
citizens receiving a summons).
1997-98]
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North Carolina's current experience may be similar. Section 9-13 of
the North Carolina General Statutes clearly states that a "person sum-
moned to appear as a juror" who has not been excused and fails to
appear "shall be subject to a fine of not more than fifty dollars.
2
However, according to the AOC's Jury Survey Project, when a citizen
fails to appear as directed by a jury summons, court officials take no
responsive action in forty-six of our counties.29 As the report notes,
"Where any follow-up does occur for these non-reporting citizens, the
most frequent action taken is that the sheriff tries to locate the missing
juror, by phone or in person.
30
II. PERTINENT JURY DUTY STATUTES
Allowing a high percentage of summoned citizens to "excuse them-
selves" from jury duty appears to violate both the spirit and the details
of the applicable statutes. In addition, such excusals are unfair to
those who are summoned and do properly respond.31 Yet, the appli-
cable statutes do not clearly define how the court system should re-
spond to such jury duty avoidance.
A. North Carolina General Statute § 9-6
Section 9-6 of the General Statutes states North Carolina's public
policy that jury service is "the solemn obligation of all qualified citi-
zens, and that excuses from the discharge of this responsibility should
be granted only for reasons of compelling personal hardship or be-
cause requiring service would be contrary to the public welfare,
health, or safety., 32 Other subsections of section 9-6 detail the proce-
dures for presenting, considering and passing on applications for ex-
cuses from jury duty.33  Yet, the excusal provisions of section 9-6
28. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 9-13(a) (1986).
29. THE CTR. FOR URBAN AFFAIRS & COMMUNITY SERVICES, supra note 2, Executive Sum-
mary at 2. See also State v. Barnard, 346 N.C. 95, 101, 484 S.E.2d 382, 385 (1997) (noting that the
sheriff used the jury list to contact would-be jurors to determine if they had received their sum-
mons and, if so, whether they intended to appear pursuant to the summons).
30. THE CTR. FOR URBAN AFFAIRS & COMMUNITY SERVICES, supra note 2, Executive Sum-
mary at 2. See also BOATRIGHT, supra note 10, at 5 ("[Ilt is hardly a secret that [the laws estab-
lishing penalties for failure to respond to jury summonses are] seldom enforced. Citizens may
feel a twinge of guilt when they toss their summons in the garbage, but they are likely to face few
other consequences.").
31. It should be noted that some of the citizens who fail to respond to a jury summons may
never have received the summons. This is particularly true in the more metropolitan counties
with more mobile populations, where the person summoned may have changed addresses since
the preparation of the jury list. BOATRIGHT, supra note 10, at 85, 119.
32. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 9-6(a) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
33. Id. at § 9-6(b)-(f).
[Vol. 23:1
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appear to be directory rather than mandatory.34 Despite these ap-
pearance and fairness problems, any violation of the spirit or details of
section 9-6 appears not to invalidate trials that utilized jury venires in
which a high percentage of summoned citizens failed to show up. In
State v. Murdock,35 evidence indicated that the district court judge ex-
cused all prospective jurors presented to him regardless of the rea-
son.36 Defendant argued that this violated section 9-6. 31 The supreme
court indicated that violation of section 9-6 was insufficient to justify a
new trial; instead, the defendant had to show "corrupt intent, discrimi-
nation or irregularities which affected the actions of the jurors actually
drawn and summoned.
38
In State v. White,39 upon order of the trial court to summon tales
jurors, the sheriff used the telephone book as the method of selection
and called sixty different prospective jurors. This effort secured only
nine tales jurors, in part, because the sheriff "excused" some of the
prospective jurors he reached by telephone who were actually quali-
fied to serve. Nevertheless, the trial court found the sheriff's selection
was made without prejudice and intent to discriminate. The court of
appeals affirmed, noting that the burden of proving intent to discrimi-
nate was on defendant and that the "mere possibility [of discri-
mination] does not make the panel actually summoned
objectionable."4
In State v. Leary,4 1 the defendant argued that in certain cases it was
unfair to shift the burden of proving corrupt intent and systematic dis-
crimination to the defendant when no records are kept of the excusal
process, the process occurs before defendant's trial begins, and de-
34. State v. McLain, 64 N.C. App. 571, 572, 307 S.E.2d 769, 770 (1983) (in determining
whether a statutory provision is to be considered mandatory or directory, legislative intent will
control, and "this is usually to be ascertained not only from the phraseology of the provision, but
also from the nature and purpose, and the consequences which would follow its construction one
way or the other.").
35. 325 N.C. 522, 385 S.E.2d 325 (1989).
36. Id. at 525, 385 S.E.2d at 326.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 526, 385 S.E.2d at 327. It is possible that at some point the deviation from the
mandatory statutory procedures will be so egregious as to prejudice the integrity of the judicial
process itself, and that this alone could suffice to require a new trial without any showing of
corrupt intent or systematic discrimination. This was the holding of the Tennessee Supreme
Court in State v. Lynn, 924 S.W.2d 892 (Tenn. 1996):
Often, the public sees in our justice system something substantially different from what
actually exists. It is the appearance that often undermines or resurrects faith in the system.
To promote public confidence in the fairness of the system and to preserve the system's
integrity in the eyes of the litigants and the public, "justice must satisfy the appearance of
justice."
Id. at 898.
39. State v. White, 6 N.C. App. 425, 169 S.E.2d 895 (1969).
40. Id. at 427, 169 S.E. 2d at 896-87.
41. 344 N.C. 109, 472 S.E.2d 753 (1996).
1997-98]
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fense counsel is not present to oversee the procedure.4 2 The supreme
court rejected this argument:
Defendant presents us no persuasive authority to depart from our pre-
vious holdings, which place the burden on the defendant to come for-
ward with evidence that the district court judge abused his discretion
in the excusal process. A review of the record reveals that defendant
presented no evidence that the district court judge in this case acted
with corrupt intent or systematic discrimination.
It seems unlikely that a high percentage of "no-shows" by itself or the
general failure to follow-up with the "no-shows" will suffice to demon-
strate corrupt intent or systematic discrimination.
However, the situation might be different if evidence showed that a
certain subset of citizens were more likely to be aware of and take
advantage of this de facto self-excusal option, and if court officials
played any active role in alerting selected citizens to this option. This
issue was raised in a 1997 Alabama case State v. Wright.44 In Wright,
the defendant argued that he was denied due process when the trial
court refused to compel the attendance of certain black
veniremembers who, having been summoned for jury duty, failed to
appear.45 The appellate court rejected this argument on the basis that
the clerk's undisputed testimony was that "nothing was done to secure
the attendance of anyone who failed to answer a jury summons"46 and
that nothing in the record suggested that "black jurors who failed to
appear were treated any differently than white jurors who failed to
appear.
4 7
B. North Carolina General Statute § 5A-11
Section 5A-11(a) of the North Carolina General Statutes lists the
specific grounds for which a person may be found guilty of criminal
contempt. 48 The statute also states that these listed grounds are exclu-
sive and that no other grounds, even if allowed at common law, will
suffice.4 9 In addition, criminal statutes must be strictly construed5" in
42. Id. at 117, 472 S.E.2d at 758.
43. Id.
44. 709 So. 2d 1318 (Ala. Ct. App. 1997).
45. Id. at 1319.
46. Id.
47. Id. (noting that fifty of the 530 summonses for jury duty issued for the term during
Which defendant went to trial were issued to black citizens. Of those fifty, thirty-nine failed to
appear).
48. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5A-11(a) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
49. Id. ("The grounds for criminal contempt specified here are exclusive, regardless of any
other grounds for criminal contempt which existed at common law."). But see id. § 5A-11(a)(10)
(providing that other statutes may specify other grounds for criminal contempt).
50. Vogel v. Supply Co., 277 N.C. 119, 131, 177 S.E.2d 273, 280 (1970).
[Vol. 23:1
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favor of the defendant.51 In this light, it would appear that of the
grounds listed in section 5A-11(a), only subsection (a)(3) might apply
to a citizen who fails to appear in response to a jury summons because
the potential juror disobeys lawful "process, order, directive, or
instruction. "52
To fit this strict construction, however, a sheriff's summons author-
ized by section 9-10(a) must fall under the definition of the "court's"
lawful process, order, directive, or instruction.5 3 Arguably, the jury
summons authorized by section 9-10(a) emanates not from the supe-
rior court but from the sheriff.54 That is, the sheriff, in summoning the
prospective juror, is acting pursuant to the sheriff's statutory author-
ity, not pursuant to the order of the superior court. If this distinction
is legitimate, the practice on some jury summons to state that the sum-
mons is "by order of the superior court" or that lists the clerk's ad-
dress as the return address should make no difference.
In the alternative, it is arguable that the more specific provision of
section 9-13 preempts the more general provision of section 5A-
11(a)(3). If a provision of a statute is general and another provision is
specific, the two should be "read together and harmonized. ' 56 How-
ever, where the two provisions are inconsistent, the specific power will
control over the general provision.57 Section 9-13 provides that
"[e]very person summoned to appear as a juror who has not been ex-
cused, and who fails to appear and attend until duly discharged, shall
be subject to a fine of not more than fifty dollars, to be imposed by the
court, unless he renders an excuse deemed sufficient. ' 58 By expressly
providing the consequences and the procedure to be followed when a
citizen fails to respond to a jury summons, it appears that the legisla-
ture intended that section 9-13 should apply in these situations rather
than the more "general and comprehensive terms" of section 5A-11.
59
Therefore, the criminal contempt provisions of section 5A-11 may not
51. State v. Richardson, 307 N.C. 692, 694, 300 S.E.2d 379, 381 (1983).
52. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5A-11(a)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
53. Id.
54. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 9-10(a) (1986) ("The register of deeds shall ... deliver the list of
prospective jurors to the sheriff of the county, who shall summon the persons named therein
55. See State v. Hoffman, 895 S.W.2d 108, 112 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that the Mis-
souri statute that required individuals contacted for jury service to be "summoned" used the
term in its commonly understood, rather than legal, sense, .e.g., to call together, to send, for with
authority or urgency, to call upon to do something, etc.).
56. Mclntrye v. McIntrye, 341 N.C. 629, 631, 461 S.E.2d 745, 747 (1995) (quoting Food
Stores v. Board. of Alcoholic Control, 268 N.C. 624, 628-29, 151 S.E.2d 582, 586 (1966)).
57. Id.
58. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 9-13 (1986).
59. But cf. Oxendine v. Dept. of Social Services, 303 N.C. 699, 707, 281 S.E.2d 370, 375
(1981) (holding section 50-13.1 of the North Carolina General Statutes to be "intended as a
broad statute, covering a myriad of situations in which custody disputes are involved" and there-
1997-98]
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apply to a citizen, properly summoned for jury duty, who does not
appear at the designated time and place.
C. North Carolina General Statute § 9-13
Historically, a "fine" is imposed by a court when a person has been
convicted of violating a criminal law; a "forfeiture" occurs when a per-
son free on bail does not appear in court and the bail is forfeited; and
a "penalty" is recoverable in a civil action.6" Section 9-13 of the North
Carolina General Statutes uses all three terms. The title of the statute
is "Penalty for Disobeying Summons,"6 1 the first sentence describes
the fifty dollars as a fine,6 2 and the second sentence then describes the
fine as a forfeiture.63  What is the nature of the consequence estab-
lished by section 9-13? The provisions of section 9-13 may not create
a civil forfeiture, 64 but a misdemeanor.
Although the precursor statutes to section 9-13 did appear to estab-
lish an automatic penalty for failure to appear in response to a jury
summons,65 the current section 9-13 does not. Section 9-13 states only
that the juror who is summoned, is not excused, and fails to appear, is
"subject to" a fine that can be in any amount so long as it is fifty
dollars or less. 66 Thus, assuming that the person was properly sum-
fore as "a general statute" pre-empted when the legislature enacted a statute expressly address-
ing custody in a specific situation.").
60. Cauble v. City of Asheville, 314 N.C. 598, 607, 336 S.E. 2d 59, 65 (1985); Board of Educ.
v. Town of Henderson, 126 N.C. 689, 691, 36 S.E. 158, 159 (1900) ("[T]here is a clear distinction
between a 'fine' and a 'penalty.' A 'fine' is the sentence ... for a violation of the criminal law...
while a 'penalty' is ... recovered in a civil action of debt."). See also Price v. Edwards, 178 N.C.
493, 500, 101 S.E. 33, 37 (1919) (noting that a statute was "clearly penal" as it made a violation
punishable by a "fine or imprisonment"). But see State v. Rumfelt, 241 N.C. 375, 377, 85 S.E.2d
398, 400 (1955) (holding that statute used terms fine and penalty interchangeably); State v. Add-
ington, 143 N.C. 683, 685-86, 57 S.E. 398, 399 (1907) (stating that the term "fine" can also mean a
forfeiture, or a penalty recoverable by civil action); Williams v. Gibson, 232 N.C. 133, 134, 59
S.E.2d 602, 603 (1950) (noting that the term "penalty" involves the idea of punishment for in-
fraction of the law). See generally David M. Lawrence, Fines, Penalties, and Forfeitures: An
Historical and Comparative Analysis, 65 N.C. L. Rev. 49 (1986) (analyzing Article IX, section 7
of the North Carolina Constitution that directs the State to use fines, penalties, and forfeitures).
61. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 9-13 (1986) (emphasis added).
62. Id (emphasis added).
63. Id (emphasis added).
64. If section 9-13 of the North Carolina General Statutes was interpreted to create a civil
forfeiture or penalty, the non-appearing juror would still be entitled to notice and an opportunity
to be heard prior to entry of any judgment.
65. In 1905, the applicable statute stated:
Every person on the original venire summoned to appear as a juror, who shall fail to give his
attendance until duly discharged, shall forfeit and pay for the use of the county the sum of
twenty dollars, to be imposed by the court: Provided, that each delinquent juryman shall
have until the next succeeding term to make his excuse for his non-attendance, and, if he
shall render an excuse deemed sufficient by the court, he shall be discharged without costs.
Former N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1977 (1905).
66. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 9-13 (1986).
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moned, was not excused and failed to appear, the judge who presides
at a section 9-13 matter must nevertheless determine in each case
whether the person's excuse was "sufficient," and, in any event,
whether the person should be fined at all and, if so, the amount of the
fine. Thus, there can be no automatic penalty - a hearing is required
unless waived by the defendant.
Section 9-13 can be reasonably interpreted to create the crime of
disobeying a jury summons because: (1) the liability for and the
amount of the fine are not predetermined and require a hearing; (2)
the clear use of the term "fine"; and (3) the lack of specificity of the
procedure to be followed.67 If so interpreted, then pursuant to section
14-1, which defines felonies and misdemeanors,68 a violation of section
9-13 is a misdemeanor. 69 Although a violation of section 9-13 might
more appropriately be handled as an infraction under section 14-3.1,
i.e., a noncriminal violation of law not punishable by imprisonment
but subject to a "penalty of not more than one hundred dollars," it is
unlikely that the crime specified in section 9-13 became an infraction
simply upon the adoption of section 14-3.1.70 If this is the case, then
prosecution of violators of section 9-13 should proceed under section
15A-1101. This statute sets forth the applicable procedure for service
of a citation or criminal summons (charging a violation of section 9-
13), scheduling and prosecution by district attorney, and no right to an
67. In State v. Addington, 143 N.C. 683, 57 S.E. 398 (1907), the court stated:
In ordinary legal phraseology,... the term 'fine' means a sum of money exacted of a person
guilty of misdemeanor, or a crime, the amount of which may be fixed by law or left in the
discretion of the Court, while a penalty is a sum of money exacted by way of punishment for
doing some act which is prohibited, or omitting to do something which is required to be
done. While the words "fine" and "penalty" are often used interchangeably to designate
the same thing, we think it will accord more with the true intention of the Legislature if we
hold that ... the word "fine" was used in the sense of punishment for a criminal offense. In
the first place, the amount is not fixed or certain, which is the general characteristic of a
fine, but not of a penalty, the amount of the latter being certain ....
Id. at 686, 57 S.E.2d at 399. Compare State v. Briggs, 203 N.C. 158, 159, 165 S.E. 339, 339 (1932)
(holding that a statute which provided "that no other person than said weighers shall weigh
cotton or peanuts sold in said town or township... under penalty of $10.00..." did not create a
criminal offense, and a penalty alone can be imposed and enforced in a civil action) with State v.
Snuggs, 85 N.C. 541, 543 (1881) (holding that where a statute not only creates the offense but
fixes the penalty that attaches to it and prescribes the method of enforcing it, no other remedy
exists than the one expressly given, and no other method of enforcement can be pursued than
the one prescribed).
68. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-1 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
69. If so, it would appear to be a Class 3 misdemeanor. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-3(a)(3)(1993);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.23(a)(1988).
70. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-3.1 (1993). Section 9-13 was adopted in 1967 while § 14.3 became
effective on July 1, 1986. No statute expressly states that a violation of § 9-13 is an infraction or
changes the term "fine" in § 9-13 (which indicates a criminal statute) to the term "penalty" or
"sanction" as used in § 14-3.1. However, § 15A-1361 does blur the significance of the fine/pen-
alty distinction as used in statutes in the post-infraction world.
1997-981
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attorney because no possibility of imprisonment or a fine greater than
fifty dollars.71
CONCLUSION
It appears that most of North Carolina's judicial districts have de-
veloped no formal procedures for handling citizens who fail to appear
when summoned for jury duty. Thus, the questions raised herein, e.g.,
does section 5A-11(a)(3) apply or is violation of section 9-13 a civil
penalty or a crime, have not been authoritatively addressed or re-
solved - and there is room to interpret these statutes in several ways.
Regardless of how these questions are resolved, several issues of prac-
tical significance remain. First, do our courts have the resources to
prosecute, for either criminal contempt or a section 9-13 violation, the
significant percentage of summoned jurors who fail to appear? 72 Sec-
ond, can non-appearing jurors be selectively prosecuted without vio-
lating the juror's rights or affecting the viability of the jury venire?
73
Third, what effect will such prosecution have on citizens' attitudes to-
wards and willingness to comply with jury duty? Finally, was section
9-13 intended to allow, or in practice will it allow, a citizen to buy his
or her way out of jury duty for fifty dollars?
74
In weighing these questions, some practical observations by those
who have studied the issue may be worth considering. As one author
71. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-451(a)(1) (1995) ("Any case in which imprisonment, or a fine
of five hundred dollars ($500.00), or more, is likely to be adjudged . . ."); see also N.C. GEN.
STAT. 15A-1361 et seq. (establishing the authority and imposition of fines for criminal offenses).
72. In 1992, in response to a judge's question about how to handle citizens who fail to
appear for jury service, AOC Court Management Specialist Miriam Saxon suggested several
"better and perhaps less expensive options that might be exercised in lieu of issuing and serving
show cause orders" under either § 5A-11 or § 9-13. These options included adding a strong
warning on the mailed juror summons on the consequences for failure to appear (e.g., criminal
contempt), mounting a public relations campaign on the importance of jury duty and the need to
appear if summoned, and adopting a policy that some court official or the sheriff would routinely
call each juror who failed to appear and warn them of the consequences for failure to appear and
attempt to defer their service until a later time. This latter approach would seem to, at least
technically, violate section 9-6(c) of the North Carolina General Statutes which allows the judge
to defer service of an excused juror; a juror who fails to appear has not been excused and pre-
sumably is subject to being drawn again pursuant to § 9-5. Letter from Miriam Saxon, AOC
Court Management Specialist, to E. Burt Aycock, Jr., Chief District Court Judge, Pitt County
(May 8, 1992) (on file with the author).
73. Jury expert G. Thomas Munsterman reports that in Washington, D.C., judges would
randomly select the unlucky "juror of the month" to prosecute for failure to appear, and that in
another city the practice with regard to prosecuting juror no-shows was that "every six months or
so we haul 10 people in here and try to get a lot of publicity." King, supra note 9, at 2673 n.106.
74. Although this would seem to be a clear contradiction of the public policy as stated in
§ 9-6, buying one's way out of jury duty did appear to be allowed under the precursor statutes to
§ 9-13. Although under these statutes there was no opportunity to seek a court-approved ex-
cusal prior to the date of actual service, the court could approve an excuse after the fact which
would have the effect of voiding the automatic penalty entered at the time the juror failed to
appear.
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observed, "[o]ver the years efforts to prevent culpable behavior rather
than punish it have proved their value, a useful lesson for those hop-
ing to improve further juror compliance in jurisdictions where jury
avoidance .. .affect[s] a significant portion of trials. '75 Addressing
the reasons citizens prefer to avoid jury duty rather than punishing
them for seeking to avoid jury duty may in the long-run prove more
effective and efficient.
Reducing the disincentive to jury service may be the preferred solu-
tion.76 Pending such solutions, however, judges must address the real
problem of jurors failing to respond to the summons and the per-
ceived problem of unfairness or selective enforcement. According to
a recent survey of judges' practices in this regard, most judges do little
to enforce jury summons but the reasons are varied: (1) proceedings
to enforce jury summons are too costly or inefficient; (2) coerced ju-
rors make bad jurors; (3) juror compliance is not so bad that any spe-
cial action is required; (4) jurors who fail to appear usually have a
legitimate reason that would be deemed sufficient if presented to the
court; and (5) holding delinquent jurors in contempt is bad publicity
for judges facing election.77 Unfortunately, after two centuries we
have not come very far in resolving the issues surrounding how the
court should respond when a summoned citizen fails to appear for jury
duty.
75. King, supra note 9, at 2675.
76. This conclusion is, of course, debatable. The first recommendation of the recent study
Improving Citizen Response to Jury Summonses: A Report with Recommendations is that the
court should enforce summonses: "The strongest finding in both of our surveys was that sending
follow-up mailings to no-show jurors and, when necessary, requiring such citizens to attend
show-cause hearings and penalizing them for their nonresponse, substantially increases summons
response rates." BOATRIGHT, supra note 10, at xii.
77. King, supra note 9, at 2703.
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